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The Ultimatum Game is commonly used to examine decision-making involved in 
social interactions (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Participants are 
instructed that one player will propose to split a certain amount of money with them 
(e.g., £10). The participants (i.e., the respondents) can choose to either accept or reject 
the offer. If the respondent accepts the offer (e.g., £8: £2), the money will be split as 
proposed; if instead the respondent rejects the offer, both players will get nothing. 
Typically, when the respondent is offered 20%-30% of the total amount, the offers are 
rejected and rejection rates increase as offers become more “unfair” (Güth et al., 
1982; Nowak et al., 2000). It has been proposed that humans incorporate social norms 
into their decision-making and reject unfair offers even when it conflicts with their 
own self-interest (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006).  
The concept of inferring others’ mental states such as their beliefs, desires and 
intentions, known as Theory of Mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), has been 
proposed as being fundamental for cooperative relationships with others (Sanfey, 
Civail, & Vavra, 2015). Performance on the Ultimatum Game is thought to rely on 
spontaneous ToM as the task involves an interactive social situation involving 
economic decision-making where individuals should consciously adopt the subjective 
point of view and intentions of the proposer in relation to oneself (Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Suleiman, Aharon-Peretz, 
Gohary, & Hirschberger, 2012). For example, Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2012) 
introduced a “greedy” condition in the Ultimatum Game where the proposer chose 
between slightly unfair and very unfair options, in an attempt to encourage individuals 
to attribute unfair, greedy intentions to the proposer. Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues 
Theory of mind, Ultimatum Game and aging 
3 
 
found that “greedy” intentions were associated with the highest rejection rates in 
healthy individuals.  
Developmental studies involving children have also provided evidence that 
ToM plays an important role as a mediator of fairness behaviour in the Ultimatum 
Game (Sally & Hill, 2006; Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 
2010; Takagishi et al., 2014). Takagishi and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that 
preschool children whose ToM had developed divided sweets more fairly than those 
whose had not. In another study involving stickers as incentives, Takagishi et al. 
(2014) demonstrated that the ability to understand another person’s mental state in 
preschool and school-age children had a positive influence on the number of stickers 
offered and a small negative effect on the rejection of unfair offers.  
While the ability to understand another person’s mental states plays an 
important role in the Ultimatum Game in children and younger adults, to our 
knowledge, no study has investigated whether ToM performance is related to 
Ultimatum Game performance in older adults. The few studies that have investigated 
the effect of age on Ultimatum Game performance have produced contradictory 
results. Some studies have found that the rejection of low and unfair offers increases 
as people become older (Beadle et al., 2012; Roalf, Mitchell, Harbaugh, & Janowsky, 
2012). Higher rejection rates of unfair offers in older adults has been associated with 
higher levels of cognitive empathy (Beadle et al., 2012). In other studies, however, 
while no overall age difference in rejection rates was found, younger adults rejected 
significantly more unfair offers made by younger compared to older proposers (Bailey 
et al., 2012). Harlé and Sanfey (2012) demonstrated that younger and older adults had 
similar acceptance rates for fair ($5 out of $10) and the most unfair ($1–$2 out of 
$10) offers but older adults accepted significantly fewer moderately unfair offers (i.e., 
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$3 out of $10). Finally, a study of individual differences revealed that there was not a 
relationship between age and acceptance rates for fair or unfair offers (Nguyen et al., 
2011). However, these previous studies have not considered that differences in the 
rejection rates of unfair offers in previous studies may be explained by ToM abilities, 
as individuals who reject unfair offers are thought to be focusing on the interpersonal 
component of the task (Handgraaf, van Dijk, Wilke, & Vermunt, 2003). 
The literature concerning older adults’ ability to understand the mental states 
of others has produced conflicting results. Several studies report poorer ToM abilities 
in older compared to younger adults (e.g., Bailey, Henry, & Von Hippel, 2008; 
Keightley, Winocur, Burianova, Hongwanishkul, & Grady, 2006; see Henry, Phillips, 
Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013 for a recent meta-analysis). Other studies  have reported 
that older adults perform as well or even better than younger adults (Happé, Winner, 
& Brownell, 1998; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002). The few aging studies 
that have considered performance on more than one ToM task in the same group of 
younger and older adults have reported age-related differences on some tasks, but not 
others (Castelli et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012), suggesting that there is not a general 
decline in ToM abilities with age. 
As far as we know, no studies have examined ToM abilities and their 
influence on Ultimatum Game performance within the same group of older adults. 
Given that better ToM abilities have been found to result in greater rejection rates of 
“unfair” offers in children and young adults (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2012; Takagishi 
et al., 2014), it is proposed that those older adults who perform better on ToM tasks 
will perform more poorly on the Ultimatum Game and accept fewer “unfair” offers. 
We administered two theory of mind tasks thought to assess affective and cognitive 
aspects of ToM: the Faux Pas task (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998) which 
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assesses ToM based on complex verbal abilities; and the Judgment of Preference task 
(Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Girardi, MacPherson, & Abrahams, 2011; 





Twenty-two younger adults (3 men, 19 women) aged 18-23 years (M = 19.55, SD = 
1.6) and 30 older adults (9 men, 21 women) aged 60-81 years (M = 69.77, SD = 6.6) 
were recruited for the study. The younger and older groups did not significantly differ 
in terms of their years of full-time education (M = 14.23, SD = 1.7 and M = 14.37, SD 
= 2.2 respectively), t(50) = -.24, p = .81.  All participants performed the 
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised (ACE-R; Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, 
Arnold, & Hodges, 2006) to assess overall cognitive abilities and the vocabulary and 
reasoning subtests from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999) to assess intellectual abilities.  The younger and older participants 
did not significantly differ in their ACE-R score out of 100 (M = 95.68, SD = 2.64 and 
M = 96.13, SD = 3.13 respectively), U = 376.50, z = .87, p = .38, and no participant 
performed below the cut-off of 82 indicating dementia. In addition, the two age 
groups did not significant differ in terms of their full-scale IQ (M = 117.09, SD = 6.6 
and M = 118.43, SD = 6.9 respectively), t(50) = -.700, p = .49. The younger 
participants were undergraduate Psychology students who received course credits for 
participating in the study while the older participants were recruited through the panel 
of volunteers at the Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh and were 
reimbursed for any expenses incurred. English was the first language of all 
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participants. None of the participants had any self-reported history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders. The study was approved by the Psychology Department 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Edinburgh and written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants.   
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
Theory of Mind Tasks 
Faux Pas task. The Faux Pas task consisted of 10 faux pas stories and 10 non-
faux pas stories (Stone et al., 1998). In the faux pas stories, participants were read 
stories in which someone said something that would hurt or offend another character 
in the story. The non-faux pas stories described a social situation in which no faux pas 
had occurred. The stories remained in front of the participants whilst being read and 
during the subsequent questions. After each story, participants were asked to respond 
orally whether someone in the story said something they should not have said (a 
maximum of 10 points for faux pas stories and a maximum of 10 points for non-faux 
pas stories). If a faux pas was detected, participants were asked a further four 
questions to determine whether they understood who committed the faux pas, the 
mental state of the character experiencing the faux pas, the mental state of the 
character who delivered the faux pas and why it was inappropriate (a maximum of 40 
points). An empathy question was also asked to determine whether participants 
understood that the person who experienced the faux pas would be hurt or offended 
by it (a maximum of 10 points). A control question relating to details of the story but 
which did not require reference to the characters’ mental states was also asked (a 
maximum of 10 points).  
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Judgement of Preference task. The Judgement of Preference task assesses the 
ability to make a preference judgment based on eye gaze and was based on the tasks 
adopted by Girardi et al. (2011) and Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz (2007). Each 
trial involved a cartoon face presented in the middle of the computer screen looking at 
one of four objects belonging to the same semantic category (e.g., animals, fruits). 
Each corner of the computer screen contained one of the four objects (see Figure 1). 
The participant’s task was to indicate which object the character was referring to 
based on a statement at the top of the screen and available cues (e.g., eye gaze 
direction). Participants performed four randomly presented first-order conditions: 
physical where participants stated which item the cartoon face was close to; look at 
where participants indicated which item the face was looking at based on his eye 
gaze; affective where the character’s facial expression provided affective information 
and participants had to respond to the picture that the cartoon face loved; and 
cognitive where the character’s face was emotionally neutral and participants had to 
respond to the picture that it was thinking of. Then there were four randomly 
presented second-order conditions where cartoon faces were presented next to each of 
the semantically-related items and participants had to understand the interaction 
between the main cartoon face and the other character: physical where participants 
indicated which item both cartoon faces possessed; look at where participants 
indicated which item both cartoon faces were looking at; affective which relies on 
understanding the main character’s emotions in relation to the other character’s 
emotions and so participants indicated which item both cartoon faces loved; and 
cognitive which relies on understanding the main character’s beliefs and desires about 
the other character’s beliefs and desires and so participants indicated which item both 
cartoon faces were thinking of. Participants responded by pressing one of four buttons 
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on the keyboard that corresponded to the four corners on the computer screen. In the 
physical and look at conditions, there were 8 trials and in the affective and cognitive 
conditions, there were 12 trials. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly but 
as accurately as possible. The proportion of correct responses was computed for each 
condition with a maximum score of 1 for each one. 
 
- Insert Figure 1 around here - 
 
The Ultimatum Game. Participants acted as responders during a series of trials 
in which a fictitious player, an opponent, made an economic offer via the computer. 
The identity of the opponent was represented by a photograph of an individual’s face 
displayed on the computer screen with their name. The 8 different opponents (4 
female, 4 male) were emotionally neutral faces taken from the NimStim Face 
Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2009). The task consisted of six types of offer each 
repeated 8 times, once by each female opponent and once by each male opponent (48 
offers in total). The offers consisted of splitting £10 between the participant and the 
opponent. Half of the offers were considered fair (opponent: participant = £4: £6, £5: 
£5, £6: £4) and half were considered unfair (opponent: participant = £9: £1, £8: £2, 
£7: £3). Participants were told they could accept or reject the offer by pressing the 
corresponding button on the keyboard. If accepted (e.g., £6: £4), the money would be 
divided as stated (the opponent would get £6, the participant would get £4). If 
rejected, both players would receive nothing. After the response, a final slide was 
presented for 3 seconds showing the outcome for that offer (e.g., “You rejected the 
offer. You both get nothing.”). The offers were presented pseudo-randomly, no 
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information about the fictitious opponents was provided and participants were not 
actually paid the money for the accepted offers.     
 
Subjective ratings of fairness and anger for each type of offer. After 
completing the Ultimatum Game, participants were presented with the six types of 
offer made during the game. For the fairness ratings, they indicated how fair or unfair 
they perceived each offer on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very unfair; 5 = very fair). For 
the subjective emotional responses, they indicated on a separate 5-point Likert scale 
how angry they felt after each offer type (1 = not angry; 5 = very angry).  
 
RESULTS 
For all post-hoc analyses, a p-value of 0.01 was applied in order to reduce the chance 
of type I error. 
 
Theory of Mind Tasks 
Faux Pas task. As the data were not normally distributed, the performance of 
the two age groups in terms of faux pas accuracy, non-faux pas accuracy and the 
empathy questions were analyzed using Mann Whitney U-Tests (see Table 1).  The 
analyses indicated that older adults did not perform more poorly than younger adults 
in terms of accuracy on the faux pas stories or the faux pas empathy scores (p > .21). 
Non-faux pas story accuracy was not significantly different in younger and older 
adults, U = 224.50, z = -2.41, p = .02. The performance on the faux pas control 
questions was at ceiling in both age groups, therefore the results were not further 
analysed. A Mann-Whitney U-Test on the non-faux pas control stories did not reveal 
any significant difference between younger and older participants (p = .24).  
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Judgement of Preference task. As performance on the first-order condition was 
close to ceiling in both age groups, only the second-order judgement of preference 
scores are considered (see Table 1). The performance of the two age groups on each 
condition was compared using Mann-Whitney U-Tests. Further separate analyses for 
each age group were conducted using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare 
performance across the conditions.  
Mann-Whitney U-Tests demonstrated no significant differences between the 
two age groups in the look at (p = .76), affective (p = .33) or cognitive (p = .84) 
conditions. There was a trend for younger participants to perform better than older 
participants on the physical condition although this was not significant, U = 211.0, z = 
-2.39, p = .02. The subsequent Wilcoxon signed-rank test analyses revealed that the 
older adults performed significantly more poorly on the physical compared to the look 
at condition, Z = -3.68, p < .001, whereas the younger participants performed 
similarly in the two conditions (p = .22).  None of the other comparisons were 
significant. 
 
- Insert Table 1 around here - 
 
The Ultimatum Game 
The mean acceptance rates and standard errors of the mean for each offer for 
the younger and older participants are reported in Figure 2. The acceptance rates were 
analysed separately for each type of fair and unfair offer using a logistic regression 
fitted with generalised estimating equations. The analysis demonstrated a significant 
main effect of offer type, 2 (5) = 745.68, p < .001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
showed that all fair offers were accepted significantly more than the unfair offers (all 
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p values < .001). No difference emerged in the acceptance rate of two of the fair 
offers (£4: £6 and £5: £5), which were both accepted more than the third fair offer 
(£6: £4, both p values < .001). The unfair offer £7: £3 was accepted significantly 
more than both the remaining unfair offers (p < .001 and .005 for £9: £1 and £8: £2 
respectively). No significant difference was found between the acceptance rates of the 
£8: £2 and £9: £1 unfair offers.   
 
- Insert Figure 2 around here - 
 
There was also a significant main effect of age group, 2 (1) = 76.65, p < .001, 
with older adults accepting more offers (M = 64.72; SD = 26.13) than younger 
participants (M = 51.61; SD = 12.49). The group x type of offer interaction was also 
significant, 2 (4) = 35.45 p < .001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the 
unfair £9: £1 offer was accepted significantly more often by older participants than 
younger participants (p < .01), while the two age groups exhibited a similar 
acceptance rate for all fair offers and the unfair £8: £2 and £7: £3 offers. Further post-
hoc comparisons showed that younger adults accepted all three fair offers 
significantly more than the unfair offers (all p values < .001). No significant 
difference emerged in the acceptance rates of the fair offers and in the acceptance of 
the unfair offers in younger participants. Similarly, older participants accepted all fair 
offers significantly more than the unfair offers (£9: £1 compared to £6: £4, p < .005; 
all other comparisons p < .001). No significant difference emerged in the acceptance 
of the unfair offers and in the acceptance of any of the three fair offers in older 
participants.  
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Subjective ratings of fairness for each type of offer. The mean fairness ratings 
for each offer was examined using Mann-Whitney U-Tests. The analysis showed that 
the two age groups did not significantly differ in their subjective ratings of fairness 
for any fair (p > .17) or unfair offer (p > .07).  
 
Subjective ratings of anger for each type of offer.  Mann-Whitney U-Test 
analysis showed that the two age groups did not significantly differ in their subjective 
ratings of anger for any fair (p > .18) or unfair offers (p > .02).  
 
- Insert Table 2 around here - 
 
The Faux Pas task and Judgment of Preference task data provide little variance 
in younger and older adults to conduct correlational analyses. Therefore, associations 
between Ultimatum Game performance and the ToM tasks were not examined. 
However, separate Spearman correlation coefficients were calculated for each age 
group between the acceptance rates for fair and unfair offers and ratings of fairness 
and anger on the Ultimatum Game. In younger adults, there was a significant positive 
correlation between the acceptance rates for the unfair offers and ratings of fairness, r 
= 0.46, p < .05, where the higher the ratings of fairness, the higher the acceptance 
rates for unfair offers. In the older participants, no correlations were significant (p > 
.05). 
 To test whether the correlations across age groups were significantly different 
from one another, Fisher's Z-transformations were then calculated. The significant 
correlation between the acceptance rates for the unfair offers and ratings of fairness in 
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younger adults was significantly different to the older adults’ correlation, Z = 2.30, p 




In the current study, while no age difference emerged for the acceptance rates for fair 
offers, older participants accepted more unfair offers than younger adults, accepting 
significantly more of the most unfair offers (i.e., 9:1) compared to younger adults. 
This age difference is unlikely to be due to perceived feelings of unfairness, as the 
two age groups did not significantly differ in their fairness ratings. In fact, both 
younger and older adults’ subjective ratings of fairness decreased in the same 
downward trajectory as the offers became more unfair. These findings suggest that 
older adults’ judgments of fairness were intact (i.e., they realise offers were unfair) 
but they are willing to consider and accept these unfair offers more than younger 
adults. While younger adults also realised that offers were unfair, this did influence 
their acceptance offers, with fewer unfair offers being accepted.  
In terms of perceived anger, there was a trend for older adults to feel less 
angry about unfair offers than younger adults, which may underlie their willingness to 
accept more of these offers. However, limited statistical power due to our modest 
sample size (N = 52: younger = 22 and older = 30) may have limited the significance 
of some of the statistical analyses carried out. A post-hoc power analysis conducted 
using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed that our sample 
size would detect large effects (d=0.8) with 80% power with alpha at .05. There was 
less adequate statistical power at the small or medium effect size level. Moreover, 
given that previous research has not found age-related differences in anger ratings for 
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unfair offers (Bailey et al., 2012), this interpretation should be considered with 
caution. 
Another aim of the study was to investigate whether an increased 
understanding of other people’s intentions influences Ultimatum Game performance 
in healthy younger and older adults. It was hypothesised that older adults who 
perform better on ToM tasks would accept fewer unfair offers. However, we did not 
find age-related differences in the ToM abilities of our younger and older adults, as 
there was little variance between younger and older adults’ performance on the Faux 
Pas task or the Judgement of Preference task. Therefore, the hypotheses relating to 
these ToM measures could not adequately be tested. In a recent meta-analysis, Henry 
et al. (2013) reported that ToM abilities were significantly poorer in older adults 
compared to younger adults, regardless of the type of ToM task administered. 
However, some types of ToM tests included the meta-analysis involved only a small 
number of cases. Moreover, some research including our own, has not found age 
differences on ToM tasks including the Faux Pas task (MacPherson et al., 2002), ToM 
stories (Happé et al., 1998) and the Judgment of Preference task (Castelli et al., 2010). 
For a review of the influence of age on individual ToM tests, see MacPherson and 
Della Sala (2015). Future work might examine whether alternative measures of ToM 
are associated with older adults’ performance on the Ultimatum Game. 
Some of the contradictory findings in the aging literature relating to the 
Ultimatum Game might be due to differences in the ratio of fair and unfair offers. In 
the current study where unfair offers were accepted more by older adults than younger 
adults, an equal ratio of fair and unfair offers were made. Other studies that have 
reported no age differences or where older adults have rejected significantly more 
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unfair offers than younger adults, unequal numbers of fair and unfair offers have been 
presented (Beadle et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2011; Roalf et al., 2012).  
Task instructions and incentives may have also influenced the motivation to 
accept monetary offers. Previous research has shown that younger and older 
participants tend to reject more unfair offers when they play with proposers via a 
computer interface and no particular emphasis was placed on the reality of the 
situation (Roalf et al., 2012). Yet, Beadle et al. (2012)’s older adults also rejected 
more unfair offers using a more naturalistic design where they were led to believe 
they were playing against the same proposer using a speakerphone. This may have led 
their older adults to feel the need to make it clear to their proposer that they would not 
accept unfair treatment. Our participants were told that they were to play a game but 
neither the reality of the situation nor whether their response to one proposer would 
affect subsequent offers were emphasised and a manipulation check was not made to 
ascertain whether participants actually believed they were playing against individuals. 
Pointing out that responses would not affect future offers may encourage older adults 
to reject offers more easily, especially when payment is guaranteed regardless (Roalf 
et al., 2012). Differences in the incentives offered at the end of the Ultimatum Game 
may have also influenced performance. Some studies inform their participants that 
they will earn an additional amount of money depending on their performance (e.g., 
Bailey et al., 2012; Roalf et al., 2012) while others do not (e.g., Beadle et al., 2012). 
The majority of our younger participants received course credits for participating 
while older individuals were reimbursed financially, independently of the outcome. 
Different incentives may have motivated our younger and older adults to perform the 
Ultimatum Game in different ways. 
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In summary, subjective ratings of fairness did not significantly differ between 
younger and older adults. However, while younger adults followed the offer values of 
“fair” versus “unfair”, rejecting more of the unfair offers, older adults accepted more 
unfair offers than younger adults. These findings imply that older adults are more 
rational in their behavior, accepting unfair offers as it is in their self-interest to accept 
even small monetary values compared to receiving nothing. Future work should 
examine whether this greater acceptance of unfair offers in older adults is associated 
with poorer ToM, using tasks that offer more of a challenge to healthy younger and 
older adults. 
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Medians and ranges for the total correct on the faux pas and non-faux pas stories and 
the proportion of correct responses on the Judgement of Preference conditions in the 
younger and older groups. 
 
 Younger Older 
 Median (range) Median (range) 
Faux Pas Task   
  Faux pas accuracy (max = 40) 36.00 (18-39) 36.50 (27-40) 
  Faux pas empathy (max = 10) 9.00 (5-10) 9.00 (3-10) 
  Faux pas control questions (max = 10) 10.00 (10-10) 10.00 (10-10) 
  Non-faux pas accuracy (max = 10) 10.00 (9-10) 10.00 (5-10) 
  Non-faux pas control questions (max = 10) 10.00 (9-10) 10.00 (5-10) 
Judgement of Preference Task   
  Physical  1.00 (0-1) 0.80 (0.1-1) 
  Look at  1.00 (0.5-1) 1.00 (0.2-1) 
  Affective  0.90 (0.7-1) 0.90 (0.8-1) 








Median and score ranges for fairness and anger judgements for each type of offer 
provided by younger and older participants. 
 
 Fairness Anger 
 Younger Older Younger Older 
 Median (range) Median (range) Median (range) Median (range) 
£4: £6 3.00 (2-5) 3.00 (1-5) 1.00 (1-3) 1.00 (1-3) 
£5: £5 5.00 (3-5) 5.00 (3-5) 1.00 (1-3) 1.00 (1-3) 
£6: £4 3.00 (1-5) 3.00 (1-5) 2.00 (1-4) 2.00 (1-4) 
£7: £3 2.00 (1-4) 2.00 (1-5) 3.00 (2-4) 2.00 (1-4) 
£8: £2 2.00 (1-3) 1.00 (1-5) 4.00 (1-5) 3.00 (1-5) 
£9: £1 1.00 (1-3) 1.00 (1-5) 4.00 (1-5) 3.00 (1-5) 
 
Higher scores indicate higher fairness/anger reported. Maximum = 5. 
 
  






Figure 1.  Examples of first-order and second-order trials.  Top left: Affective first 
order; Top right: Affective second order; Bottom left: Cognitive first order; Bottom 
right: Cognitive second order 
 
Figure 2.  Mean percentage acceptance rates with standard errors of the mean (SE) for 
each offer in the younger and older groups. 
  




Dina loves … 
Dina is thinking of … Dina is thinking of the animal 
that … wants 
Dina loves the animal that … 
loves 
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